LEBANON WITH A VIEW

A 2030 VISION OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS

THE SCENARIO FACTORY

DIRECTORS

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Dr. Abdelmaoula Chaar
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The Scenario Factory is an informal think-tank established by the ESA in 2015 out of the conviction that academic research should have direct and sensible applications. Its objective is to produce applied research destined to the Lebanese authorities and the civil society.

Every year, the Scenario Factory will conduct a foresight study on the long-term implications of a major societal or economic issue in the Levant and will formulate concrete recommendations to the decision makers concerned. A white paper summarizing its main findings and conclusions will be presented to the public and published.
Scenarios have been used in companies since the 1970’s¹, and much earlier by military planners and policy-makers to anticipate and address future changes in their environment². Scenario thinking consists in studying the interactions and the implications of a number of key trends and uncertainties (political, economic, social...). This method is used to test strategic options, identify blind spots and make sense of complex environments. It explores extreme possibilities in order to help decision-makers consider the “unthinkable”.

“Scenarios encourage disciplined, systematic thinking about the future. A critical role of scenarios is to present different possible pathways into the future to challenge conventional thinking and to encourage debate in a process of learning.”³

Several methods might be used to reach this objective. The Scenario Factory relies on the simplest one, which boils down to:

- An extensive phase of preliminary research and consultation to gather expert opinions and collect quantitative and qualitative data;
- A mix of creativity and analytical rigor that uses uncertainties as analytical variables;
- An obligation to produce scenarios that should first and foremost be plausible. Accordingly, we avoid as much as possible inventing future events. We try instead to refer to actual events that happened somewhere at some point.

The Syrian refugee crisis is perhaps the most documented ever. Comprehensive data are being updated almost daily; expert reports are literally piling up ... Why then this white paper?

Six years after Syria went into civil war, what could the Scenario Factory possibly add to this mountain of information, investigations and analyses?

- First, a peculiar point of view that is... the Lebanese one.
- Second, an unusual time horizon: 2030

The Lebanese Point of View

The ratio of 27 refugees to 100 nationals that was at some point achieved in Lebanon is the highest ever observed in the world’s history. There are more Syrian refugees in Lebanon, a country of 4.5 million inhabitants, than in the entire – 510 million inhabitants – European Union.

The Gulf countries and the European Union (EU) have the same agenda: keep refugees away at any cost, even at the risk of compromising the very survival of other countries. In that regard, no country is as threatened as Lebanon. Yet, despite the vital importance of a long-term strategic vision to confront this crisis, the Lebanese authorities have not produced a full-fledged plan to date.

These are the main reasons why we decided to study this crisis and why we chose the point of view of its most complex stakeholder, namely the “Lebanese
central authority”. We adopted this denomination instead of “central government” due to the peculiar governance system established by religious communities to ensure their viable cohabitation, at the cost of having government decision-making capacities undermined by multiple peripheral centers of power. The denomination “Lebanese central authority” refers to this complex political ecosystem.

The Time Horizon: 2030

In a setting where the most pervasive keyword is “transitional”, two key data must be considered:

• On average, protracted refugees\(^4\) stay 26 years in their country of asylum\(^5\),
• When the conditions for a safe return are met, 30 to 35% of the refugees remain in their country of asylum\(^5\).

A long-term vision of the refugee crisis in Lebanon is not provocative: it is the only one that makes sense.

4. UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five years or more in a given asylum country.
5. Interview with UN official, 2016.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The “Scenario Factory” developed three scenarios that highlight the lack of resilience of the Lebanese institutions. In the first (Sarajevo Beach), they collapse, in the second (Phoenixia) they are deeply reformed, and in the third (Boot Camp) they are suspended for an indefinite period of time. Irrespective of the scenario that may eventually unfold, Lebanon’s current political system would not survive the refugee crisis.

Whilst these scenarios confirm the obvious — *i.e.* no positive outcome if the number of refugees remains high — they also show that there is no symmetric outcome: a low number of refugees is not sufficient *per se* to generate a positive scenario. In fact, there is another prerequisite: foreign donors must realize that the current level of financial assistance to Lebanon is no more than a drip-feeding that must be substantially increased if they want — their preferred scenario, *i.e.* Phoenixia — to unfold. The good news is that none of the three scenarios unfolds by chance: there are actual options. None of these scenarios
is the result of some kind of fatality. All three occur as a result of decisions or absences of decision at specific times during the course of the crisis. The good news is that actors have choices and are able to decide the future course of their collective destiny by selecting a specific option.

**Which of these scenarios is the best?**

From the perspective of the international community, notably the EU, _Phœnixia_ is the most favorable scenario, because it introduces a dose of secularism in the political system that enables the Lebanese central authority to grant Syrian refugees a status consistent with their long term stay in Lebanon. _Phœnixia_ implies, on the part of foreign donors, a large-scale economic recovery plan on top of their yearly contribution; but if this condition is met, it is a plausible scenario because it spares Lebanon a shock therapy: by 2030, there would have been sufficient time to explain, implement, and digest the necessary reforms. From the perspective of the Lebanese central authority, however, _Phœnixia_ is not necessarily the most desirable — nor the least painful — scenario. At least under today’s conditions, a number of experts view _Phœnixia_ as a risky bet and an undemocratic move altogether. The two alternative scenarios — _Sarajevo beach_ and _Boot Camp_— are not very appealing either. But they are more comfortable, in the sense that they do not require a pro-active attitude on the part of the Lebanese central authority, whilst preserving the current sectarian – based political system— albeit in different manners.

In sum, each of these scenario comes with an important — but different — price to pay for Lebanon, and this is why none can be consensual.

The choice is larger than it seems, because within each option, there is a shade to select. The task of the Scenario Factory was to describe where alternative routes would lead. It is now the task of the Lebanese central authority to choose one of them and decide how far it should be pursued, whether through action or through inaction.
KEY FACTS AND FIGURES
1.1. THE QUESTION OF REFUGEES

The notion of refugee is not exactly new in the Levant. Lebanon granted asylum to Palestinian refugees after the 1948 Palestine war, some 900,000 Lebanese citizens became refugees themselves during the civil war (1975–90) and since 2011, between one and two million Syrian refugees arrived in Lebanon to flee the Syrian conflict.

This is common knowledge. Less known is the fact that Lebanon already hosted — and generated — refugees thousands of years ago. As a matter of fact, the Levant is nothing less than the historical cradle of asylum:

“The practice of granting asylum to people fleeing persecution in foreign lands is one of the earliest hallmarks of civilization. References to it have been found in texts written 3,500 years ago, during the blossoming of the great early empires in the Middle East such as the Hittites, Babylonians, Assyrians and ancient Egyptians.”

When European countries adopted this right, around the 6th century, churches were turned into sanctuaries... Famous European refugees of the past include Descartes in the Netherlands, Voltaire in England, Hobbes in France...

After WWII, millennia of customary practices were eventually embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose Article 14 states:

“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”

The right of asylum was later spelled out in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee – so-called Geneva Convention – and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee. As a result, the notion of refugee has now a legal definition, that is:

“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

Since Lebanon is not a party to the Geneva Convention, Syrian refugees are not technically “refugees”. They are “displaced persons”. But for the UNHCR that coordinates most of the local or international assistance, for the other international organizations and for all the NGOs involved, Syrians are refugees. In fact, the nuance is increasingly blurred, for just as in Jordan, the protracted conflict in Syria forces the Lebanese central authority to open the

job market to these “displaced persons”, starting with the least controversial sectors by Lebanese standards, e.g. construction, farming and cleaning services. But many Syrian engineers, lawyers, economists, or technocrats of all sorts are accepting any job for the time being in the hope that their skills would be recognized some day.

1.2. THE NUMBER CONTROVERSY

1.2.1. How Many?

The Syrian refugees are the largest population of refugees generated by a single conflict in one generation. There were 4,898,353 registered refugees as of February 1st, 2017, and a total of 8.7 million displaced persons within Syria at the end of 2016.

To date, the main European Countries of asylum include Serbia (and Kosovo), Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Netherlands, Austria and Bulgaria. Total Syrian asylum applications in the EU reached 884,461 between April 2011 and October 2016. The rise has been steep: 625,000 asylum applications in 2014 against 1,255,640 in 2015. But Syrians are refugees among many others: in Greece for example, the majority of the refugees come from Iraq and Afghanistan. In Europe, the influx of Syrians continues to increase, but with slightly over 10% of the total refugees, it remains very low compared to figures in Syria’s neighboring countries.

Turkey is the first country of asylum with 2,854,968 Syrian refugees as of January 12, 2017, followed by Lebanon and Jordan. But in terms of refugee per capita, Lebanon displays by far the highest ratio. Even when using UNHCR data that only take into account registered refugees, the contrast is stunning:

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4. Ibid.
1.2.2. How Many in Lebanon?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugees per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 28</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to UNHCR, there were 1,011,366 Syrian refugees in Lebanon as of December 2016, as follows:\(^5\):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male (49.7%)</th>
<th>Female (50.3%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 4</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 11</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 – 17</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 59</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 +</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This count was never reliable. And it is even less reliable now, for the Lebanese government has closed the border and stopped registration of refugees on 31 December 2015. It has also ordered the de-registration of new arrivals since January 2015 (on that day, the official number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon was 1,069,111). To date, the official number used by Lebanese officials is 1,500,000. In addition, there is a “circular immigration” involving another 300,000 to 400,000 refugees.

\(^5\) Source: UNHCR – http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. Incidentally, the ILO claims a predominantly female population, with only a small proportion of male refugees of working age.
Syrian “commuters”, who traditionally come and go to work temporarily in agriculture and construction.

Expert estimates vary between 1 and 2 million Syrians in total, but it is not clear whether they always include circular immigration. An accurate count of the refugees in Lebanon is practically impossible, for unlike in Jordan, the Lebanese authorities follow a “no-camp policy” that puts a comprehensive census out of reach.

Increasing? Decreasing?

Again, estimates are contradictory. According to some sources, the peak was reached in mid-2015 with 1,500,000 refugees, and it has decreased since to around 1,200,000. Other sources question this trend: in their opinion, the closing of the Syrian-Lebanese border in December 2015 and the end of refugee registration in Lebanon compromised data collection and resulted in an underestimation of the actual number of refugees. Several factors might cause an increase in the number of refugees in the future, notably an extension of the war zones or a sectarian fragmentation of Syria, resulting in a massive exodus to Lebanese regions populated by the same religious group.

1.2.3. A Tipping Point?

This is arguably THE question. For most of the experts we interviewed, the answer is yes, there is a tipping point. As the refugees’ hope to return to Syria withers due to the protracted conflict, there is an increased competition in all sectors (labor, housing, lands, water, energy...), as well as negative adaptive practices (e.g. child labor, begging, child marriages, prostitution...) that inevitably increase tensions with local populations and mutual resentment.

Most experts situate this tipping point around 1,500,000—the 2015 peak. In their opinion, this is the maximum
number of refugees Lebanon can host. Beyond this threshold, the refugee crisis might change in nature.

A dissenting minority refuses this idea of a tipping point and considers that nothing but geopolitics can explain why Lebanon has not already collapsed. In their view, Lebanon’s most prominent external influencers are simply avoiding a confrontation because they are oil-producers whose priorities have shifted to domestic issues since the oil price drop. As long as they will be deterred from waging a proxy war on Lebanese soil, Lebanon will be able to absorb more refugees: 1 million, 2 million… The actual figure does not matter. Conversely, should they decide otherwise, a massive and violent rejection of the refugees could occur even if their number decreases.

We believe that these two opinions are not mutually exclusive. Clearly, Lebanon cannot accommodate an indefinite influx of refugees. But there is probably more than one tipping point.

The pressure is high on schools, services, housing, infrastructures… An expert also pointed out that Syrian refugees are “expensive” because many come from the middle class, with “illnesses of the rich” (e.g. diabetes, cardio-vascular diseases, cancer…) that are not found in other refugee crises (e.g. in Darfur).

The action of the Lebanese government and its partners is coordinated via the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) to provide humanitarian assistance to almost 2,800,000 highly vulnerable individuals and invest in related services, economies and institutions. For 2016, the LCRP estimated the funding needs at USD 2,480,000.

On February 4, 2016 at the London Conference, Lebanon requested a complementary funding for long term investment in infrastructure, education and economic development, broken down as follows:

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6. The conference’s key documents are available at: https://www.supportingsyria2016.com
When subtracting the LCRP from the above total of 5.879 Bn USD, what Lebanon has in fact asked is an additional 3.399 Bn USD over 5 years, that is, a little over a 27% increase of the LCRP (679.8 Mn USD/year). This figure is surprisingly modest, considering that the Lebanese government estimates the losses incurred as a result of the refugee crisis at $13.1 Bn between 2012 and 2015, of which $5.6 Bn in 2015 alone (over 11% of the GDP)\(^7\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Yearly Amount</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total (in million USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCRP (Lebanon Crisis Response Plan)</td>
<td>$2,480.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$2,480.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE I &amp; II (Reaching All Children with Education)</td>
<td>$300.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$1,500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investing in municipalities to create jobs</td>
<td>$200.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$1,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEP (Subsidized Temporary Employment Programme)</td>
<td>$60.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$180.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of solid waste infrastructures</td>
<td>$500.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction of Nahr-el Bared Palestinian camp</td>
<td>$52.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$156.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison expansion and improvement</td>
<td>$31.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,623.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$5,879.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.1. Benchmarking

For the sake of comparison, the Marshall Plan amounted to 13 Bn USD in 1948 (approximately 130 Bn USD in current dollar value)\(^8\), allocated among the beneficiary states over a four-year period roughly on a per capita basis. The largest recipient was the United Kingdom (26% of the total), which got 33.8 Bn USD in current USD value. With a population estimated at a little over 50 Mn in 1948\(^9\), this meant 676 USD per capita.

With a current population estimated at around 6 Mn including the refugees, Lebanon would, under this Plan, obtain a little more than 1 Bn USD per year (exactly 4.056 Bn over a four-year period), to be on par with post-WWII UK. In other words, the Marshall Plan is not an advantageous benchmark.

The terms of the treaty signed in 2016 between Turkey and the EU bring foreign assistance to another level. Turkey obtained no less than 6 Bn Euros (6.856 Bn USD – May 11, 2016 rate) over 2 years, an EU visa exemption for its citizens and a rekindling of its adhesion process to the EU. In exchange, it has become a “reservation” for Syrians: every refugee who does not qualify for asylum in an EU country can be deported to Turkey and “swapped” with another Syrian that meets the criteria for asylum, within a limit of 72,000 refugees. The questionable legality of this agreement is notorious\(^{10}\). Its appalling cynicism too. However it is by far the most advantageous benchmark for Lebanon.

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10. The Geneva Convention forbids its members to expel a refugee, especially to a country that is a non-member or, as in the case of Turkey, is a member but restricted its application to... Western refugees.
THE SCENARIO MATRIX
2.1. SELECTING THE KEY UNCERTAINTIES

Listing and organizing certainties and uncertainties is at the core of the scenarios process, as it eventually leads to the definition of the scenario matrix. After having identified and ranked one hundred uncertainties (see Exhibit 1 for the detailed process), we selected the following two key uncertainties:

- The number of refugees;
- The ability of the Lebanese central authority to govern the state.

2.2. THE EVENTUAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN LEBANON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Uncertainty #1</th>
<th>Sustainable (&lt; 450,000)</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
<th>Non-sustainable (&gt; 1.5 millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Both in terms of impact and potential implications, the most important uncertainty is the maximum number of
refugees that Lebanon can host. This number is clearly conditioned by the outcome of the war, but not only. Also, as discussed above, there is more than one hypothetical tipping point, depending on the balance of powers among the external forces at play in Lebanon.

Higher end: This figure corresponds to the 2015 peak estimated to be around 1.5 million, that is, a little over 25% of the Lebanese population. Whilst not necessarily a tipping point, most experts agree that beyond, Lebanon would enter into unchartered waters.

Lower end: As indicated above, data from previous refugee crises in other parts of the world indicate that even when the conditions to return home safely are met, 30 to 35% of the refugees stay in their country of asylum and there is no reason why the Syrian refugee crisis should deviate from this pattern. However, as pointed out by an expert from the Bekaa, dry statistics overlook local sociological dimensions (“one is never totally cut from one’s roots…”) and this further complicates projections about actual refugee return.

Our calculation is based on two sources:
- 1,011,366 refugees (UNHCR estimate as of December 31, 2016);
- 1,500,000 refugees (the figure officially retained by the Lebanese government).

One third of the average of these two figures represents roughly 450,000 refugees, that is about 10% of the Lebanese population.

Arguably, extrapolations about the actual number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and its implications are subjective. Two aspects remain certain however:
- The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon cannot increase indefinitely without consequence;
- A significant portion of these refugees will stay in Lebanon irrespective of the final outcome in Syria.
2.3. THE ABILITY OF THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY TO GOVERN THE STATE

Key Uncertainty #2  Weak Governance of the state → Strong

The second key uncertainty was far more debated within the team. Some experts considered that economic uncertainties (e.g. the Lebanese GDP, or the level of foreign assistance) were more instrumental. Others thought that the prime variables were political uncertainties such as the duration of the Syrian war, or the ability – or inability – of the government to address the refugee issue. Eventually, a majority settled on the governance of Lebanon, although for different reasons.

This uncertainty is primarily intended to assess the ability of the Lebanese central authority to make autonomous decisions and, in particular, to formulate and implement at local level a national refugee policy. However, it is a complex uncertainty because what “local” means is very ambiguous, just as the zero-sum game this implies.

For example a strong state does not necessarily mean weak municipalities, for it may decide to decentralize significant portions of the refugee crisis management. Conversely, a weak state does not necessarily imply strong municipalities, for regional layers of governance may emerge. In fact, only a strong state may shield municipalities from informal forces.

Overall, this uncertainty about the governance of the state boils down to the distance that separates Lebanon from a Westphalian Nation-state that would overcome all sectarian or communitarian considerations.
These scenarios are detailed in the next chapter, but a few preliminary remarks are of use:

1. The northeast quadrant is a so-called “transition scenario” because it is based on an unstable combination that ultimately results in another scenario. Indeed, either the Lebanese central authority:
   - Eventually reduces the refugee influx, resulting in a shift to Phœnixia in the southeast quadrant; or
   - Is overwhelmed by the refugee influx, resulting in a shift to Sarajevo beach in the northwest quadrant.

2. The southwest quadrant is a so-called “business as usual” scenario. It shows that less refugees in Lebanon is not necessarily good news, because for the Lebanese central authority, it is also an incentive to continue not to act.

3. The southeast quadrant is a conditional scenario, subject to a profound reform of Lebanon’s political system and a substantial increase of the current level of foreign assistance.
THREE SCENARIOS FOR 2030
### 3.1. Three critical paths: a summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>It becomes clear that the Syrian conflict will not end in the foreseeable future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees keep coming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Donors’ motivation and support decreases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Growing tensions with refugees, leading to inter-sectarian tensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Private militias appear but the army is too divided to confront them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The state collapses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SARAJEVO BEACH**

**BOOT CAMP PHŒNIXIA**

2016–2020

It becomes clear that the Syrian conflict will not end in the foreseeable future.

Refugees keep coming.

Donors’ motivation and support decreases.

Growing tensions with refugees, leading to inter-sectarian tensions.

Private militias appear but the army is too divided to confront them.

The state collapses.

Elimination of ISIS Caliph.

Rivalries among potential successors precipitate the fall of the Caliphate in 2019.

The Syrian regime is back on track with a coalition of former opponents.

Syria’s reconstruction resumes slowly.

Many refugees return home. The total number of Syrians in Lebanon stabilizes at 850,000.

Syrian regime reinstalled in large areas.

Reconstruction begins.

Slow economic recovery.

In Lebanon, the total permanent refugee population stabilizes at 500,000.

The impact of the Syrian recovery on Lebanese economy is disappointing.
It becomes clear that the Syrian conflict will not end in the foreseeable future. Refugees keep coming. Donors’ motivation and support decreases. Growing tensions with refugees, leading to inter-sectarian tensions. Private militias appear but the army is too divided to confront them. The state collapses.

**Elimination of ISIS Caliph.**

Rivalries among potential successors precipitate the fall of the Caliphate in 2019.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOOT CAMP</th>
<th>PHŒNIXIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of ISIS Caliph.</td>
<td>Syrian regime reinstalled in large areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalries among potential successors precipitate the fall of the Caliphate in 2019.</td>
<td>Reconstruction begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Syrian regime is back on track with a coalition of former opponents.</td>
<td>Slow economic recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria’s reconstruction resumes slowly.</td>
<td>In Lebanon, the total permanent refugee population stabilizes at 500,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many refugees return home. The total number of Syrians in Lebanon stabilizes at 850,000.</td>
<td>The impact of the Syrian recovery on Lebanese economy is disappointing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Massive exodus of Syrian and Lebanese refugees to Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>UNSC resolution to keep peace in Lebanon and contain the refugee influx to Europe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No community is able to prevail.

De facto division of Lebanon in 3 cantons.

Struggle to access resources, forcing the communities to maintain a minimum coordination.

The impact of Syria’s recovery on the Lebanese economy is disappointing.

In parallel, international assistance to Lebanon has drastically decreased.

This combination of factors causes a shift from economic stagnation to recession, a race to the bottom on labor conditions and in turn, refugee repression.

Christian massive emigration only worsens inter-community tensions.

In parallel, crime rate rises.

Conditions are met for a large exodus from Lebanon. To avoid this, the EU and the GCC propose a conditional 6 Bn. Marshall plan for Lebanon if Syrian refugees are integrated.

The Lebanese government accepts, knowing that this means drastic changes…

Good socio-political timing.

Lebanon joins WTO in 2022.

New family code in 2023.

Economic growth resumes, jobs are created.

Social conditions improve.
The impact of Syria’s recovery on the Lebanese economy is disappointing.

In parallel, international assistance to Lebanon has drastically decreased.

This combination of factors causes a shift from economic stagnation to recession, a race to the bottom on labor conditions and in turn, refugee repression.

Christian massive emigration only worsens inter-community tensions.

In parallel, crime rate rises.

Conditions are met for a large exodus from Lebanon.

To avoid this, the EU and the GCC propose a conditional 6 Bn. Marshall plan for Lebanon if Syrian refugees are integrated.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>Massive arrival of foreign experts, causing an increase in rents and basic goods prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>Mass privatizations, official end of banking secrecy. For the IMF and the World Bank too, it is Business as usual.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lebanon becomes an international protectorate.

What is left of Lebanese power rests in sectarian cantons.
Chapter 3: Three Scenarios for 2030

Sarajevo Beach

Boot Camp

Refugees get organized.

They quickly become an important lobby, but without counterparts: the government and the parliament are paralyzed.

Lebanon enters a major political & economic crisis.

Economic elites convince the army to take over to resolve the deadlock.

A military coup takes place in 2027.

This is the army. Now.

Phoenixia

Foreign investment arrive in Lebanon from Asia and Europe.

Manufacturing is booming in special economic zones.

Palestinians obtain a status similar to the Syrian refugees.

Inter-community marriages are now commonplace.

Almost full employment is achieved.

Western tourism develops.
3.2. SARAJEVO BEACH

In Short

- Under the weight of the refugees, internal tensions eventually threatened Lebanon’s existence
- The EU and the Gulf countries did not let this happen, to avoid an additional flow of refugees
- Lebanon divided into cantons
- It is now a Bosnia-like protectorate governed by ruthless foreign experts of all sorts

2016 – 2030: What Happened?

Too divided, the international community proved incapable of ending the Syrian conflict. As a result, the prospect of a protracted conflict discouraged a number of donors and international assistance decreased.

On September 14, 2017, the newly elected French President made an official visit to Beirut. In a speech at the Parliament, he confirmed that the — still unpaid — 100 million Euros promised by his predecessor to help Lebanon address the refugee crisis were still budgeted\(^1\). But after having thanked Lebanon for its sacrifices, he added that France was not prepared to increase its quota of Syrian refugees. The message was clear: Lebanon was on its own.

Refugees kept coming to Lebanon, as emergency relief was setting aside long-term development plans, mass poverty kept growing and wages continued to drop, leading to increased tensions with local populations and in turn, among communities.

\(^1\) This promise to pay Lebanon 100 Million Euros over a 3-year period was made in Beirut by François Hollande on April 1, 2016. Source: http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2016/04/16/francois-hollande-promet-au-liban-100-millions-d-euros-pour-les-refugies-syriens_4903597_3218.html
Refugee protests against curfews and systematic controls imposed by security forces and by municipalities led to more repression.

Refugees had no choice but to concentrate in the least inhospitable areas, *i.e.* Palestinian camps for those of Palestinian origins and the Northern border for the Sunnis, leading to an uneven sharing of the refugee burden among Lebanese communities and ultimately, to a fertile ground for extremism and mutual resentment.

In the North, local militias composed of Lebanese and Syrian citizens became increasingly powerful with the massive smuggling of weapons from Syria.

Urged to intervene, the army was paralyzed by soldiers who refused to confront their own religious community. Eventually, this last symbol of unity collapsed and with it, the country: thousands of soldiers joined local militias. Skirmishes became commonplace, but no religious group managed to prevail militarily. Instead, each group, with or without the assistance of foreign sponsors, struggled to secure a territory with as much resources as possible.

Shortly after 2020, Lebanon was *de facto* divided into three confessional areas: a Saudi-controlled Sunni area at the Syrian Border, an Iran-controlled Shiite area in the Bekaa and the South and a—EU but not so clearly—controlled Druzo-Christian area in the rest of Lebanon.

Beirut remained Beirut, that is, a multi-confessional enclave where communities continued to trade while competing more or less openly for its control.

Another exodus to Europe—this time of both Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals—began. The elites
flew first, using the main commercial airlines and their double citizenship. Hundreds of thousands followed, through routes monitored by Syrian and Libyan mafia networks.

Faced with another humanitarian disaster, the EU had no choice but to convince both Iran and Saudi Arabia to support the French resolution proposal for a UN intervention in Lebanon to end the rampant civil war and force the religious communities to find a settlement.

Imagination, let alone customization, is not the international community’s strongest skill. The tragedy of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its forced resolution and the remodeling of the country by the international community was an obvious template. Accordingly, the plan for Lebanon was modeled after the Dayton peace plan. And the peace settlement imposed upon the belligerents took place in Dayton, Ohio. For good luck’s sake probably, assuming its predecessor was a success.

The fate of Lebanon was sealed: de facto confessional areas were turned into de jure cantons and Lebanon into a confederation – in fact, another UN protectorate, occupied by blue helmets and managed by an international administration.

**2030 Synopsis**

Big white SUVs are roaming everywhere in Beirut: the High Representative appointed by the UN Security Council is celebrating his fourth anniversary as the head of Lebanon and as always, the ceremony is taking place under high protection.

What is left of the Lebanese army and police forces continues to patrol. But under the authority – and close supervision – of blue helmet officers.
Depending on their canton of residence, the situation of the refugees varies. The two largest groups of refugees are in Sunaland and in the greater Beirut. In Sunaland, they are an important political player and a key partner of the local authorities. At the opposite of the spectrum, in Shi’iland, they live in camps and have a Palestinian-like status, worsened by the fact that the UNHCR has largely withdrawn from Lebanon.

Since the High representative is primarily concerned with peace maintenance, refugees are left with no institution to defend their interests.

The reform of the electoral system was one of the first measures implemented by the High Representative: citizens now vote where they reside.

The High representative is from the Fiji Islands and he has little knowledge of, nor interest in, Lebanese political subtleties. For that matter, this trait is his main asset: he cannot be suspected of favoring any of the usual external influencers of Lebanon. Two weeks ago, he imposed a fine on Parliament members who voted against a bill he expected the Parliament to pass rapidly. A week ago, he cancelled the – regular – election of a prominent political leader in Druzoland who is on his personal blacklist of potential troublemakers and thus, not eligible.2

2. This happened in the autonomous district of Brcko, in Northern Bosnia. In December 2007, Raffi Gregorian the brcko Supervisor suspended the salaries of the entire government and assembly members because the Assembly was one day late in voting the budget.

3. This happened in the Serb entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srbska). On 5 March 1999, taking the view that the attitude shown by the elected President Mr Poplasen undermined the Dayton agreement, the High Representative Carlos Westendorp announced his removal from office. For an account of this reckless exercise of power by “high” representatives of the international community, see e.g. Matthew Parish, International Officials, 13 ARIEL (2009).
In social and political terms, the situation has not improved. The international community maintains peace with massive subsidies. The EU is primarily involved in capacity building in the Cantons.

Overall, the Lebanese economy has deteriorated, due to the massive brain drain and the abolition of the banking secrecy. But there is no shortage of low-skilled jobs in retail, services and construction, thanks to the presence of thousands of highly paid foreign experts who run the international administration.

Unsurprisingly, the real estate market is very active. Rental prices are rocketing in Beirut, pushing the locals to the farther outskirts.

The main losers of this evolution are the State institutions, which have been stripped of their sovereign prerogatives and the municipalities, which are now totally subordinated to the Canton authorities.

As a sovereign country, Lebanon is history, but to whom does it really matter? Certainly not to the refugees and probably not to a sizeable percentage of the Lebanese population. In fact, what really matters to most had been preserved, namely the religious communities and their respective lifestyles, together with not better but not worse than before living conditions.
Three Scenarios for 2030

Chapter 3

More refugees arrive
Schools overwhelmed
Infrastructures saturated
Health system deteriorates
Crime rate rises

State goes bankrupt
Wages drop

Refugee riots
Refugee divisions worsen
Army is split among communities

Under refugee pressure, EU member-states reach a consensus to intervene in Lebanon

Unprecedented refugee flow to Europe

Refugee flow out of control

International community more divided than ever, the war in Syria worsens

Weak central state with minimum prerogatives administered by the UN & subsidized by EU to monitor refugee flow to Europe

Dayton-type peace settlement Lebanon becomes a confederation of cantons

Opposed parties forced to maintain a degree of coordination to access resources
Access to resources becomes critical

EU-Iranian coalition to stabilize Lebanon

De facto split of the country

Sporadic armed confrontations

Iran eager to preserve its influence

Basic public services no longer available

Type of influence
- Political
- Economic
- Social
- Technological
- Environmental
- Legal

Sunnis represent 65% of inhabitants in Lebanon

Capital evasion
Foreign investment drop

State goes bankrupt

Somalia-like situation

Major economic recession

Access to resources becomes critical

Tax collection hampered

Informal / mafia economy grows

International community more divided than ever, the war in Syria worsens

Political divisions worsen

Opposed parties forced to maintain a degree of coordination to access resources

Access to resources becomes critical

EU-Iranian coalition to stabilize Lebanon

De facto split of the country

Sporadic armed confrontations

Iran eager to preserve its influence

Basic public services no longer available

Type of influence
- Political
- Economic
- Social
- Technological
- Environmental
- Legal
3.3. Boot Camp

In Short

- War in Syria ended in part, with limited impact on Lebanon’s economy
- Syrian refugees faced growing hostility in Lebanon, leading to more repression and to a widening inter-community gap
- Major social and economic crisis
- Eventually, a coup called by business elites took place
- Now, the Army runs Lebanon

2016 – 2030, What Happened?

The elimination of ISIS Caliph by a drone in 2018 and the ensuing rivalries among his potential successors precipitated the fall of the Caliphate. In 2019, ISIS was reduced to a handful of armed groups scattered along the Syrian-Iraqi border.

Thanks to Russia’s efforts, the Syrian regime miraculously survived, and after a decade of civil war, it was reinstated. Of course, at that point, Bachar El Assad had no choice but to form a surreal coalition with some of his fiercest opponents.

Reconstruction and economic growth in Syria resumed, but slowly. With the reopening of the border with Lebanon, many Syrian refugees returned home, but many remained in Lebanon, for lack of reason to return: no more family, no more possession... Although their living conditions in Lebanon were poor, they had managed to survive, and their children were now embedded in the Lebanese school system.

Taking into account the usual 300,000 to 400,000 Syrian “commuters” that constantly cross back and forth the
border when it is open, the total number of Syrians in Lebanon eventually stabilized around 700,000.

By 2020, it was clear that the long awaited Syrian recovery was having a far more limited impact than expected on the Lebanese economy. In parallel, the end of the Syrian conflict had resulted in a drastic decrease of international assistance to Lebanon. In the early 20s, foreign assistance to the refugees boiled down to a few women empowerment programs that were giving the male refugees an impression of abandonment by the international community.

This combination of negative factors caused a shift from economic stagnation to depression.

As economic recession increased intercommunity tensions, the Lebanese central authority found itself unable to maintain the status quo that had prevailed for over a decade. But due to its own divisions, it was also unable to make decisions about the refugees, let alone important ones.

Unemployment rate kept rising and the state budget was increasingly depleted by a creeping informal labor market, where Syrian refugees accepted the worst conditions for a few dollars a day.

This race to the bottom inevitably aggravated resentment against refugees, as well as the resentment of the refugees against their ruthless employers.

Without surprise, criminality was also on the rise and with it, police repression, especially against refugees, leading to further intercommunity tensions.

In 2025, Aida Moughawech, widow of the late Jad Moughawech, a famous communist war hero, became the emblematic figure of the refugee community and began organizing it. Two years later, Syrian refugees
were a powerful Lebanese stakeholder, thanks to her political flair. But it was too late: she no longer had institutional interlocutors. The government and the parliament were paralyzed by the political consequences of the economic crisis.

In the Christian community, the emigration rate reached a historical peak in 2024, threatening the reality of its existence as a Lebanese religious—and hence political—community. One could have thought that this would simplify the Lebanese equation, but of course, it did not: with two major political groups left face to face, intercommunity tensions kept growing, announcing armed confrontations.

On May 1st 2027, the suspension of the convertibility of the Lebanese pound was a turning point. Prominent Lebanese families from all sides held a secret meeting during which they decided to ask the army to take over the control of Lebanon in order to unlock the political decision-making process.

On June 17, 2027, General Zakar-Baal made a speech on the TV and radio channels: Lebanon was now under military rule. A Military junta would manage Lebanon’s affairs until the circumstances would permit the organization of civil elections—no date was specified.

2030 Synopsis

For the first time in its history, Lebanon has monolithic and centralized governance with no opposition: the central government is the Lebanese central authority.

To better control the refugees, the government has gathered them in camps. Aida Moughawech is in prison. She is now on the second week of her hunger strike and the military junta is concerned by her
deteriorating health because she has become an Amnesty International icon.

As usual, the international community is ambivalent. On the one hand, it is officially unwilling to support a military dictatorship. On the other hand, it is worried that inter-religious confrontations might erupt again if military repression ends, with a risk of triggering a refugee flow to Europe, both Lebanese and Syrian. As a compromise, international assistance to refugees has resumed and NGO’s presence in refugee camps is massive, albeit under military supervision.

Following the model developed in Jordan, refugee camps have been equipped with wireless connections. Mobile devices have been massively distributed to refugees to enable them to attend online courses and trainings, but also to work. The government accepted to consider that as long as a job is performed online for a company located outside of Lebanon, a work permit is not required. In exchange, these companies have to pay a flat tax to the Lebanese treasury. Depending on their level of skills, refugees do everything that can be done online, from software development and encoding to photo matching. In addition, several call centers have been established in various camps for Arabic-speaking MENA and Gulf customers.

Unlike their freedom of movement, the economic situation of the refugees has improved. Western companies that remotely employ refugees get a substantial bonus in CSR ratings, so there is no shortage of jobs. Thanks to this refugee laundering, thousands of young unemployed Lebanese have discreetly joined the network, pretending to be Syrian.

Intercommunity tensions have significantly decreased. Thousands of weapons have been seized and troops are
deployed in sensitive areas, preventing the reformation of armed groups.

The economic situation remains Lebanon’s main problem, though. Decisions can now be made, even the most drastic. But the banking system has not recovered yet and many foreign investors are waiting for a clarification of the political situation. As a result, the military government has little financial resources to implement any program other than rigor and large cuts in public expenditures. But it is confident that once a reasonable period of official reprobation will have elapsed, the international community will significantly increase its financial support, for a military government in Lebanon will always be preferred to an unknown alternative.

To date, the promise made by the General Zakar-Baal to submit a new constitution to a national referendum has not materialized. Instead, elections have been postponed for the second time and no future date has been announced. The so-called “transitional government” has just celebrated its third anniversary and the business community is not as supportive of the army as it used to be. It is now like all the other stakeholders: waiting.

As in many other stable dictatorships, the “deal” with the civil society – Lebanese and Syrian alike – is simple: in exchange for their freedom of expression and an unconditional submission to the regime, most individuals have access to some means of subsistence and a reasonably functioning public service. And their freedom of religion, especially behind closed doors, is guaranteed and protected.
Three Scenarios for 2030

Chapter 3


Refugees exploited on informal labor market. Crime rate rises. Women empowerment remains the only "bankable" issue with foreign donors. Traditional balance of powers shattered. Business elites urge army to intervene.


Political governance worsens. Leninization of Lebanon. Christian immigration rate higher than ever. Formal economy continues to develop.

Normal economic activities resume in Syria. Violence declines significantly in Syria, a large portion of the country is stabilized. Border reopens. Rebuilding of Syria begins. About 350,000 refugees remain in Lebanon (in addition to the usual 500,000 commuters).


Central power has little incentive to improve refugee status. Lebanon about to collapse.
3.4. PHOENIXIA

**In Short**

- A large percentage of refugees is now settled and fully integrated in Lebanon
- To achieve this goal, the international community consented to a major economic recovery plan
- This meant drastic, but economically fruitful political changes
- The government adopted a new refugee management strategy (Turkish style): new refugees easily “find” routes to the EU.

2016 – 2030, What Happened?

With the help of Russia and the tacit approval of the US, the Syrian regime regained control over large zones in Syria in 2017. Only the region bordering Iraq remained unstable, as ISIS resistance was still strong. This partial stabilization triggered reconstruction in some devastated urban areas and, with the subsequent job creations, a slow economic recovery.

The border with Lebanon reopened in 2018 and thousands of Syrian refugees decided to return home. On their way, they crossed thousands of new Syrian refugees fleeing “stabilized” areas for fear of retaliation by the regime.

In 2020, the total number of refugees in Lebanon stabilized around 600,000, that is, 150,000 new refugees on top of the 450,000 who decided not to return home.

The economic situation in Lebanon kept deteriorating and did not benefit from the limited Syrian recovery. The situation of the refugees was worse than ever, as rejection by local populations and repression by local forces increasingly took violent turns.
All the conditions for a massive exodus of Syrian refugees as well as unemployed Lebanese citizens were met. The EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council, knowing they were their next destinations, struggled to avoid this outcome at any cost. After intense consultations, they agreed that the only solution was to settle refugees permanently where they lived. This meant convincing the Lebanese government to give them a refugee status and allow them to work. But there were two major obstacles:

- The massive unemployment rate in Lebanon;
- The integration of a population whose vast majority belonged to the same religious community represented a major threat to the Lebanese political model. Moreover, the Palestinian refugees would inevitably claim the same treatment, adding to the confessional imbalance.

To overcome the reluctance of the Lebanese government, its interlocutors offered a massive Marshall plan, commensurate with the Turkish precedent...

Eventually, Lebanon obtained:

- 6 Billion Dollars to be invested in infrastructure;
- No custom duties on “made in Lebanon” products exported to the European Union, the US or the Gulf states.

In exchange, the Lebanese government agreed:

- To deliver 200,000 work permits to refugees;
- To grant Lebanese citizenship to the Syrian refugees born in Lebanon that would apply for it once they reach their majority.

Aware of the stakes, the Lebanese central authority carefully avoided a Parliamentary debate, but to the general surprise, there was little reaction.
With the help of NGOs, a long pedagogical work ensued in the media and in municipalities to convince skeptical and worried citizens that a new era had begun.

As the massive construction of infrastructure drastically reduced unemployment, economic growth resumed and social conditions improved, including for the Palestinians, whose status had been aligned to that of the Syrians.

With better infrastructure and a better business climate, the very favorable export regime enjoyed by Lebanon could attract foreign investment from Asia and Europe and a manufacturing industry flourished in special economic zones, enabling a lasting economic recovery.

2030 Synopsis

In 2030, Lebanon’s economy is not as buoyant as it used to be in the 20’s. But the momentum has been seized. The grace period lasted long enough to change mentalities and ensure that the former political system is now history, thanks in particular to the return of disenchanted Westernized elites from the Lebanese diaspora, among whom the government abundantly recruited highly skilled technocrats with little or no community ties.

Although borders are better controlled, refugees—mainly economic ones now—keep arriving from Syria and Iraq. But most municipalities have close ties with the smugglers and they ensure that this influx never amounts to a threat to local stability: whenever the influx becomes too important, large discounts are offered on
alternative clandestine routes to Jordan, Europe and now the Gulf countries.

Of course, the Lebanese central authority is aware of this. It discreetly encourages this informal regulation in order to protect the labor market. It is walking on thin ice however, because the EU and other foreign donors are closely monitoring the implementation of the economic recovery plan.

The last 2 billion tranche of the plan is supposedly on its way, but just as 15 years ago, when the refugee crisis was at its peak, payments are lagging. The Lebanese government resents this drip-feeding but tries not to give a pretext for further delays.

Due to this mix of tight control and economic development, Lebanon has been nicknamed “the Singapore of the Middle East”. This is not the whole picture, though: Lebanon’s cultural revival is another major achievement of the past decade.

Boys and Girls from the first generation of Syrian refugees born in Lebanon are now graduating from universities and with their Lebanese passports, they can pick any job they want. But as many from their generation, they want to become entrepreneurs in the Silicon Sabra.

Silicon Sabra? Initially, this Palestinian camp — and its complex legal status — attracted internet pirates and virus designers who – just as in Palestine – were using legal loopholes regarding the applicable intellectual property law

But when the Palestinian status in Lebanon improved after it was aligned with that of the Syrians, Sabra

4. The city of Jenine, in the West Bank, is a well-known “digital heaven” of the kind
became a « normal » quarter in Beirut, under the scrutiny of the international community, and pirates had no choice but to reconvert. They are now encryption experts, pirate hunters, antivirus developers and firewall testers.

In a world where Internet piracy causes every year the bankruptcy of thousands of companies, they are extremely successful. The Sabra label is now legendary and so is the fortune of some of its emblematic entrepreneurs. In Beirut, apartments in the stadium area are now more expensive than on the seafront.

Three symptoms indicate that Lebanon entered into a new era:

- Since the adoption in 2023 of a new family code establishing civil marriage, intercommunity marriages develop, although not as fast as outside observers would like;
- The green party won the 2030 municipal elections in Tripoli, Tyr and Saida;
- Western tourism is back.

Of course, there is no shortage of nostalgics who regret the old sectarian political system, even among those who used to suffer from its flaws. But living conditions are better, and this satisfies a majority of the population.
Syrian war does not end but there is now a stabilized area (West of Euphrates) under Russian control.

Syria’s official state is confined to a few tribal zones.

Limited rebuilding of Syria begins.

Some refugees return, new ones arrive.

The total number of refugees in Lebanon stabilizes around 500,000.

Border reopens.

EU continues to fear refugee flow.

Gulf states continue to fear refugee flow.

Limited rebuilding of Syria begins.

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EU continues to fear refugee flow.

Gulf states continue to fear refugee flow.

Stable Economic Zones (SEZs) duty free export to EU are established to create “insulated” jobs for Syrians in manufacturing and agriculture.

A major adjustment of the political mindset is required to keep this promise.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) attract massive investment from Asia.

Significant improvement of business climate.

Western investment resumes.

Pending legal reforms can be implemented.

Overall social conditions improve.

Stars aligned for a radical reform of the political system.


Lebanese gov’t commits to give work permits to 200,000 refugees.

Lebanon joins WTO.

A major adjustment of the political mindset is required to keep this promise.

Important Economic growth.

SEZs attract massive investment from Asia.

Environmental Conditions improve.

Infrastructures improve dramatically.

Lebanon becomes a Nation-State.

Civil marriage allowed.

Gulf states continue to fear refugee flow.

EU continues to fear refugee flow.

Gulf states continue to fear refugee flow.

Massive return of disenchanted diaspora elites from Western countries.

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Gulf states continue to fear refugee flow.
You said resilience? Prepare the civil society to the forthcoming political changes

“International donors’ promotion of the narrative of Lebanon’s resilience has come at a cost, namely the further delay of structural and political reforms that are of critical importance to the country’s future […]. Glorifying the concept of resilience has tended to normalize Lebanon’s abnormalities […] in the form of path dependence on sectarian representation and on weak state institutions.”

The myth has been stretched to its limits: according to our scenarios, the current Lebanese institutions will not survive the refugee crisis. In Sarajevo Beach, they collapse, in Phœnixia they are profoundly reformed and in Boot Camp they are suspended for an indefinite period of time.

The question is not if, but how they will be changed and by whom.
A FEW MORE SURPRISES

Three additional findings must also be considered:

- Whilst the scenarios confirm the obvious – i.e. no positive outcome if the number of refugees remains high – they also show that this question does not boil down to a matter of more or less war in Syria. “Less war” is but one of several ways to decrease the number of refugees. And some of them are not out of the reach of the Lebanese central authority.

- The Gulf countries seem unable to remain durably off the radar: they reappear in two scenarios out of three. Their relative importance could be justified by their own political fragility and the threat it represents for the region, but in both instances, our discussions revolved around their eagerness to monitor the refugee situation.

- Conversely, the absence of Israel from the three scenarios is equally remarkable, for there is no shortage of arguments in favor of a different outcome.

A STRAIGHTFORWARD ROADMAP?

Our scenarios are associated with stumbling blocks that leave decision-makers with a straightforward roadmap:
CURRENT SITUATION

Does the total # of refugees decrease?

Yes

Are refugees integrated?

Yes

Phœnixia
- Assertive w/ EU & Gulf States
- Decisive inside

No

Boot camp
- The army takes over

No

Sarajevo Beach
- Community split
- Lebanon is now an international protectorate

No
From the perspective of the international community, notably the EU, *Phœnixia* is the most favorable scenario. But the international community is not our “client”. And from the perspective of the Lebanese central authority, *Phœnixia* is not necessarily the most desirable — nor the least painful — scenario:

- It is doubtful that a majority of the Lebanese civil society is willing to accept, let alone implement, the kind of political changes that it requires. At least under today’s conditions, a number of experts view *Phœnixia* as a risky bet and an undemocratic move altogether;

- Sarajevo beach and Boot Camp are not very appealing either. But they are more comfortable, in the sense that they do not require a pro-active attitude on the part of the Lebanese central authority, whilst preserving the current sectarian-based political system, albeit in different manners.
SEEKING PHŒNIXIA...
Phœnia may not be the favorite scenario of the Lebanese central authority, but various factors may push in that direction, e.g. the pressure exercised by the international community, or an economic recession. In a first stage, it will boil down to a negotiation, but it means much more in the long run.

Below are the key points to consider and be prepared for, should Phœnia unfold:

INTEGRATE REFUGEES

Jordan’s predominantly Palestinian population proves that an absorption of a foreign population on a large-scale is possible. Of course, the vast majority of Jordanians and Palestinians are Sunni and obviously, it matters. In Lebanon, there is only one way to achieve a similar cohesion: religious identities must be marginalized.
In addition to this negative harmonization, a manageable number of refugees is also required.

What number? According to the experts interviewed, any figure below 1 million is acceptable, although from 450,000—the minimum number of refugees that will permanently stay in Lebanon—to 1 million, there are probably different thresholds with different implications.

Assuming Lebanon succeeds in keeping the Syrian population below this 1 million threshold, what does it mean in practice to “integrate” them? There are in fact short-term implications and some long-term ones.

In the short run, it merely means granting basic rights to refugees, that is, a right to make a living and hence, access to the labor market and basic social coverage. But how “basic” are these rights, considering that they are currently unavailable to a sizeable percentage of the Lebanese population itself, let alone Palestinian refugees?

Given the current unemployment rate in Lebanon (in the vicinity of 12%¹ and up to 34% for youth²), how many more workers can the labor market absorb? Assuming a working population predominantly composed of males aged 18–59, a target of one salary per family of refugees implies a minimum of 200,000 work permits.

Moreover, since it is inconceivable to give Syrians more rights than to the Palestinians who arrived seventy years ago, additional work permits would have to be issued to align the status of both refugee populations.

It is simplistic to consider that migrants are just a burden on the labor market because their very presence, and the additional consumption it entails, generates new jobs. Many experts like to use the example of the US economy,

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¹. Source: ILO (2015, p. 39)
where it is estimated that in the past two decades, every new migrant created 1.2 jobs.

But how comparable is the Lebanese economy? Neither construction, nor the service economy, nor agriculture can be stretched to create hundreds of thousands of additional jobs3. In practice, this goal cannot be achieved without an important diversification of the economy, notably in manufacturing, as discussed below.

In the long run, integration will have to acquire a more ambitious meaning in order to preserve social peace.

When, in his April 2016 report4, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon urged hosts country to “… examine where, when and how to afford the opportunity to refugees to become naturalized citizens.”, he achieved a rare phenomenon in Lebanese politics, namely a general consensus. The outcry was such that the UN spokesman had to point to the fact that Lebanon was not mentioned in the report and that the UN supported the return of Syrian refugees and their reintegration in their country of origin5.

2030 is a symbolic turn, the time when a first cohort of Syrian refugees born in Lebanon will be university students who have reached their majority age. It seems sensible to admit that at least those of them who will still be residents in Lebanon should be given the option to acquire Lebanese citizenship. This is not as unrealistic

3. See e.g. Ishac Diwan speaking about labor market issues related to Syrian refugee crisis at the workshop held in Beirut on 4 and 5 May 2016 by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Lebanese Center for Policy (LCPS) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8imBlL0xXs
as it seems by today’s standards, considering that the question will not have to be dealt with before 2030.

But again, to address this legal matter in a manner that can be understood and accepted by the Lebanese—and the Palestinian—populations, it is important to ensure that Syrian refugees do not enjoy a preferential treatment. Accordingly, granting Lebanese women the right to transmit their citizenship to their children should come first in the order of priorities, and the Palestinian refugees must not be omitted from the process.

DECREASE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES

If one agrees that 1 million refugees is the maximum Lebanon can integrate, then their current number—whatever the actual figure—must probably be reduced. But how can the influx of refugees be contained or even reduced if the war goes on?

Lebanon is remarkably passive on this issue. To outside observers, it displays the image of a country that views itself altogether as a country of departure for its own citizens and a final destination for the Syrians refugees.

For Syrian refugees, Lebanon is a logical destination for unlike in Jordan, they can settle anywhere in the country and unlike in Turkey, their children can attend schools in Arabic. Clearly, Syria’s other neighboring countries are not as appealing as Lebanon. But Europe is.

What should Lebanon do to become a little less of a final destination and a little more of a hub? Maybe just wait,
because the EU agreement with Turkey to alleviate the pressure on Greece and the increasingly brutal hostility of the central and eastern European countries will deeply alter the map of the Syrian refugee routes.

Until recently, the main route to Europe was terrestrial: Turkey, then the crossing of the Evros River, then Thrace, then the Balkans. Syrian refugees are increasingly deterred from using these routes. But their willingness to reach Europe remains intact. And the smugglers that have turned their dramatic journey into one of the most profitable businesses of the twenty first century will simply buy less trucks and more boats to develop alternative refugee route to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea⁶.

The closure of the Balkans and the greed of the smugglers should gradually turn Lebanon into one of the Mediterranean hubs to Europe. How much resources should Lebanon devote to controlling its coasts in order to preserve Europe? Just as with Turkey, it depends on the agreement it can reach. And this evolution should increase its bargaining power.

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None of the above-discussed reforms is conceivable without a lasting, favorable economic climate. Considering the current shape of the Lebanese economy, this means that a large-scale recovery plan must be negotiated with foreign donors and specifically the most threatened by the Syrian refugee crisis, that is, the EU and the Gulf States. The US, however, should not be left aside in spite of the current position of the Trump administration on the matter.

1. What Amount?

As seen in Chapter 1, the relevant benchmark is the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. Under an equivalent plan and on a per refugee basis, Lebanon would be roughly entitled to the 3.64 Bn USD per year it requested in February 2016 at the London conference. However, Lebanon’s enormous refugee / national ratio is nowhere accounted for. It is, we believe the angle that should be adopted when negotiating with the international community: the threat posed by the presence of Syrian refugees is by no means comparable in Lebanon and in Turkey.

It is to specifically address this threat that a large-scale plan to jump-start the economy is necessary, and it must come on top of the donors’ yearly contribution to assist refugees.

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2. What Terms?

As seen above, the Lebanese central authority can make two major concessions in the negotiation:

- **First**, it can confirm the intention expressed in 2016 at the London Conference to deliver up to 200,000 work permits to refugees, with a timetable that could be indexed on the level of job creation;
- **Second**, provided the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is stabilized under 1 Mn, it can commit to grant Lebanese citizenship to the Syrian refugees born and residing in Lebanon that would apply for it when they reach their majority.

In exchange, Lebanon should ask for three kinds of contributions from the international community:

- **First**, Lebanon is entitled to the same amount that was granted to Turkey by the EU, that is, 6 Bn Euros over a 2-year period. This amount should be invested primarily in improving existing infrastructures and developing new ones, notably to set up Special Economic Zones for manufacturing industries. In addition to creating a better environment for foreign direct investment, this large-scale program would immediately create thousands of jobs in construction.
- **Second**, a commitment that the ceiling of 1 Mn Syrian refugees in Lebanon will be maintained irrespective of the developments of the war in Syria. Thus, the international community must be prepared to grant asylum to additional refugees when this quota is met. “The US can contribute by taking a leadership role in organizing a coalition of countries willing to accept refugees – but
first it must agree to resettle more refugees on US soil."

• Third, a commitment to set up special economic zones — as in Tripoli — in order to launch a large-scale labor-intensive manufacturing sector in Lebanon. But considering the profusion of free trade zones in the region — notably in Jordan — the international community must help enhancing their attractiveness. An efficient incentive could be a duty free regime on selected “made in Lebanon” products exported to the EU, the US and the Gulf states. The US granted such preferential treatment to Haiti in 2006, as part of its support to this country’s economic recovery after the earthquake.

With hindsight, this measure did contribute to attract foreign investment in sectors such as the textile industry9.

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9. The so-called HOPE I Act (Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement) was initially aimed at promoting investment in the apparel industry by granting a duty-free treatment of select apparel imports from Haiti, provided Haiti met rules of origin and made progress on worker rights, poverty reduction, and anti-corruption measures. HOPE I was amended in 2008 (HOPE II) to simplify rules and procedures, extend the preferences for 10 years and expand the duty-free regime to more products (notably knit articles). For a comprehensive analysis of HOPE I & II, see e.g. J. F. Hornbeck “The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act”, Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2010. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145132.pdf
PREPARE THE CIVIL SOCIETY TO THE FORTHCOMING POLITICAL CHANGES

Changing institutions not only implies a painful agreement among the political and religious leaders concerned, it also requires a massive adhesion of the citizens. This means a prior phase of pedagogy to overcome doubts and fears and hence, the organization of a comprehensive and consistent nation-wide awareness program.

Experience shows that the success of this kind of endeavor depends on four key factors:

• **First, develop a shared sense of urgency.** This means a sense of the desirability of the reform as much as a sense of the undesirability of the alternative options. In a famous precedent that took place in South Africa during the transition from apartheid to democracy, the so-called “Mont Fleur scenarios” were published in South African newspapers precisely to achieve this common sense of their preferred future. They also created a common language that later facilitated the understanding of—and the adhesion to—President Mandela’s roadmap.  

• **Second, give “a face” to the transition.** This means setting up a steering committee led by a charismatic representative of the civil society (artist, intellectual, businessman…). This committee, composed of emblematic personalities would embody the reform and be accountable for the progress accomplished.

• **Third, empower the people, *i.e.* keep it local whenever possible.** Municipalities will be as instrumental in this pedagogical phase as they already are in the day-to-day management of the refugee crisis. Lebanon should rely on this local

grounding to implement special economic zones and ensure that their potential drawbacks, notably in terms of labor conditions, will be contained within acceptable ethical boundaries.

- **Fourth, keep the momentum, *i.e.* produce “quick wins”**. In this respect, resuming parliamentary debates to authorize civil marriages in Lebanon could be an important symbolic gesture. Such a measure would have the advantage of not imposing unwanted changes upon conservative groups, while giving more secular citizens the possibility to live according to their values.
SARAJEVO BEACH OR BOOT CAMP?

Phœnixia, is a conditional scenario whose prerequisites include a profound reform of Lebanon’s political system and a substantial increase of the current level of foreign assistance. In contrast, neither Boot Camp nor Sarajevo Beach require any prior action on the part of the Lebanese central authority. In fact, inaction is the central ingredient that leads to either scenarios.

Boot Camp is a so-called “business as usual” scenario, in the sense that it is a plausible outcome of the mere continuation of today’s short-sighted policy vis-à-vis the refugee crisis in a context where the main contextual variables do not vary significantly, notably the weakness of the institutions. It shows that:

- Less refugees in Lebanon is not necessarily good news, because for the Lebanese central authority, it creates an incentive not to act;
In the context of the current refugee crisis, it is illusory to expect that the inaction of the authorities can preserve the status quo.

Sarajevo Beach is also the consequence of the inability of the Lebanese central authority to decide the kind of in-depth measures that are required by the Syrian refugee crisis. It is not a “business as usual” scenario however, because it involves a number of refugees that is greater than today, leading to a different chain of events and hence, a different outcome than in Boot Camp.

With passivity as the main driver, the main question is not “how to make it happen?”, as with Phœnixia but “will it happen?”.

Whilst scenarios are not a crystal ball, they nonetheless enable an identification of early indicators — so called “memories of the future” — that announce the likely unfolding of one of them.

To that end, we established the following list of critical turning points whose occurrence, or lack of occurrence (in no specific order) would signal that a scenario is in the process of materializing:

Each of these turning points was then numbered and placed in its corresponding scenario(s) as follows, so that multiple occurrences in the same quadrant (announcing the unfolding of a scenario) may be visualized:
1. Most of Syria is secured
2. A few Syrian zones secured
3. Syrian war worsens
4. Convertibility of the Lebanese pound suspended
5. Lebanon joins WTO
6. High unemployment in Lebanon
7. Global economic recession
8. Work permits delivered to Syrian refugees
9. Refugees remain “displaced persons”
10. Refugee flow to Europe continues
11. New family code enacted
12. Marshall Plan for Lebanon
13. Repression of refugees in Lebanon
14. Tensions with local population grow
15. Crime rate rises
16. Local militias appear
17. Lebanese army holds
18. Refugee flow to Lebanon contained
19. Intercommunity tensions worsen
20. Emerging refugee lobbies
21. Capital evasion
Where is Lebanon actually heading? This is what this monitoring tool is about: just sit back, observe and see where lights are turned on. Some events or actions appear, by definition, in more than one scenario, but patterns typically emerge, although not necessarily at an early stage:

1. Most of Syria is secured
2. A few Syrian zones secured
3. Syrian war worsens
4. Convertibility of the Lebanese pound suspended
5. Lebanon joins WTO
6. High unemployment in Lebanon
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21. Capital evasion
CONCLUSION
A dystopian bias?

A set of scenarios is typically contrasted. Accordingly, one should expect a somewhat equivalent dosage of black and white, of yin and yang…

In this case an imbalance was inevitable, because our matrix generated an uneven number of scenarios. But this does not explain the pessimistic tone that seems to pervade every scenario, as if we, at the Scenario Factory, were the victims of an epidemic of dystopia…

This impression is due to the relative weight of two key findings:

- First, the lack of resilience of the Lebanese institutions, regardless of the scenario that unfolds;
- Second, a number of refugees that does not generate symmetric outcomes: a high number systematically generates negative scenarios, whereas a low
number does not necessarily lead to a positive outcome. Hence this predominantly dark vision.

**FOLLOW THE GUIDE?**

Being a pro-active scenario, Phoenixia inevitably required a more detailed presentation than *Boot Camp* and *Sarajevo Beach* – two predominantly passive scenarios. Nothing else is to be found behind this differentiated treatment: no attempt to “sell” a particular option, much less some sort of Westernized agenda that would pay little attention to the Lebanese context and the actual aspirations of the people...

Each of these scenario comes with an important – but different – price to pay for Lebanon, and this is why none can be consensual.

The choice is in fact broader than it seems, because in addition to the option, there is a shade to select. The task of the Scenario Factory was to describe where alternative routes would lead. It is now the task of the Lebanese central authority to choose one of them and decide how far it should be pursued, whether in action or in inaction.
THE MAKING OF 1 EXHIBIT
At the scenario factory, the design of scenarios consists in a 4-phase process, as follows:
Phase 1: clarify “the angle”, i.e. the point of view from which the research question is asked. This implies specifying who the “client” is, but also understanding its historical background, the driving forces that shaped it and its current ecosystem.

Phase 2: find a consensus on the few certainties and the numerous uncertainties about the future of the question studied and select the two most instrumental uncertainties.

Phase 3: explain what each of the scenarios obtained means, using the two selecting uncertainties;

Phase 4: identify the events whose occurrence might lead to either scenario. This so-called “back casting” phase helps explaining why and how each scenario occurred.

The Scenario Factory team determined that the “client” would be the “Lebanese central authority”, that is, the peculiar blend of stakeholders that detains central power in Lebanon. Once the client was defined, we explored its present ecosystem, namely:
• *Its transactional environment*, which comprises the stakeholders with whom it interacts.
• **Its contextual environment**, which comprises the actors and parameters with which it does not directly interact, but that nonetheless influence its actions.

The purpose of this phase was to look at the Lebanese central authority from several angles in order to achieve a dynamic understanding of its present state.
LISTING CERTAINTIES AND UNCERTAINTIES

In order to identify the critical uncertainties, the team ranked events or situation according to their degree of certainty or uncertainty. Two separate lists were created:

1. Certainties
Certainties are events or situations that the team unanimously believed would be there or happen over the time frame considered for the scenarios. Unanimity is difficult to achieve and the rather limited list we ultimately produced is presented in the table below:

| POLITICAL                  | • Many events might cause a massive increase of the refugee influx  |
|                           | • The Syrian conflict will last, although some Syrian areas could be stabilized |
| ECONOMIC                   | • Poor/bad treatment of refugees will inevitably backlash          |
|                           | • Post-war reconstruction in Syria will positively impact Lebanon’s economy |
|                           | • Lebanon is not equipped to address the magnitude of the refugee crisis |
| SOCIOLOGICAL               | • More refugees will result in more social tensions               |
|                           | • A sizable percentage of refugees will never return to Syria      |
| TECHNOLOGICAL              | • I.C.T could help imagine new jobs for Syrian refugees            |
| ENVIRONMENTAL              | • Syrian refugees seriously drain existing infrastructure         |
| LEGAL                      | • Lebanon will not sign the Geneva conventions unless it is forced to |
2. Uncertainties

Uncertainties are events or situations that at least one person in the team believed could have more than one outcome. They are of course far more numerous than certainties.

In a first stage, the team made a long list of approximately two hundred uncertainties, which it reduced to 100 uncertainties after having eliminated redundancies and uncertainties that were too vague to be exploited.

3. Ranking Uncertainties

Then, each uncertainty was ranked on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high) along two axes:

- Its potential impact, whether political, social, economic...
- Its potential implications, that is, the diversity of its possible consequences, whether political, social, economic...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  POLITICAL</td>
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<td>2  POLITICAL</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Level of personal debt of Syrian refugees</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Average duration of refugee stay in Lebanon</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Remaining family ties in Syria</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Syrian relatives that found asylum in other countries</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>% of skilled/trained refugees</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Refugees mortality rate</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Number of refugees' violent death</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Refugee's birth rate</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Number of children among refugees</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Number of refugees dying in transit</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>% of female refugees</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Refugees' life expectancy</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Infant mortality rate among refugees</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Prevalence of underweight</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Number of surgical procedures on refugees</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Access to food</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Number of violent acts in refugee communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Number of suicides among refugee populations</td>
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<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td># of single parent families</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Number of refugees studying in Lebanese schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>Impact</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td># of NGOs involved</td>
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<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Total # of refugees in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Access to water</td>
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<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Dispersion of refugees on Lebanese territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Refugees' literacy rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td># of Syrian refugees worldwide</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td># of refugees that unaccounted for</td>
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<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Urbanization rate</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Rural population</td>
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<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>TECHNOLOGICAL</td>
<td>Social networks</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>TECHNOLOGICAL</td>
<td># of internet connections</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>TECHNOLOGICAL</td>
<td>Availability of online training</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
<td>% of agricultural land</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
<td>CO² rate</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
<td>Water quality</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
<td>Number of natural disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>LEGAL</td>
<td>Refugees access to work</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>LEGAL</td>
<td>Syrian refugee status in Lebanon</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>LEGAL</td>
<td>Evolution of Palestinian status in Lebanon</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The mapping of this ranking appears in the graph below:

Multiplicity of implications
(1 = low - 5 = High)

Impact
(1 = low - 5 = High)
4. Choosing Critical Uncertainties

Unsurprisingly for a research question such as the refugee crisis, these uncertainties are predominantly political and economic. As shown below, even those that we decided to label “social” or “legal” are in fact multi-dimensional and could have been classified as “political” or “economic” as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>POLITICAL Ability of political institutions to reform themselves</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>4,8</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>POLITICAL Governance of the State</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>POLITICAL Refugee’s attitude in Lebanon</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>POLITICAL Evolution of the Syrian conflict</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,7</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>ECONOMIC Lebanese GDP growth rate</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>ECONOMIC Sustainability of donors’ current level of assistance</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>ECONOMIC % of obsolete infrastructure</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>ECONOMIC Net financial assistance received from donors</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>ECONOMIC New businesses registered</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>SOCIAL Total # of refugees in Lebanon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>LEGAL Refugees, access to labour market</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>LEGAL Syrian refugee status in Lebanon</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SCENARIO FACTORY: THE TEAM
The Scenario Factory activities are co-directed by Pr. Karim Medjad and Dr. Abdel-Maoula Chaar

- Karim Medjad is the holder of the Chair of “International development of the enterprises” at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers in Paris. He is also a legal expert for multilateral institutions and governments. Both his practice and academic research focus on global norm-making and scenario planning. Pr. Medjad is a Harvard Law School graduate and he holds a Ph.D. in economics from Pantheon-Sorbonne University.

- Abdel-Maoula Chaar is the head of the research, studies and documentation center at ESA. Dr. Chaar holds a Ph.D. degree in Management from Paris-Est University. He teaches courses in management, strategy, Islamic finance and methodology. His research interests focus on sustainable development and alternative means for financing micro-ventures.

The experts that kindly accepted to participate to this endeavor are:

- Paul Chucrallah, Managing Director of Berytech Fund II. He is a former banker, having held several senior positions in Lebanese commercial and investment banks, and served clients in a wide variety of sectors, ranging from services to insurance to manufacturing. He also has specific former experience in the Private Equity sector, having taken part in the establishment of a private equity venture as well as in the credit cards sector. Prior to that, Paul was a consultant with a leading firm in London. He holds a telecom engineering degree from l’École Supérieure des Ingénieurs de Beyrouth (ESIB) and an MBA from INSEAD.

- Barbara Daoud Perini, Head of Operational Strategy at Société Générale de Banque au Liban sal. Prior
to that, she was Head of Economic Research and coordinated the bank’s institutional relations with supranational organizations. Her background, as an economic and business consultant for public and private sector in the region, encompasses hands on experience with social and economic development issues, design of economic policy and private sector empowerment.

• Sana Hajj-Safa is the Head of the Economics and Management Department at CNAM Lebanon, where she has developed several degrees in continuing education and consultant at UNESCO’s regional office and ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice). Dr Sanaa Hajj, holds a Ph.D. from Bordeaux University and her research focuses on corporate finance, SME financing, investment choices and funding for start-up and business plan evaluation and elaboration.

We wish to express our gratitude to Colonel Simon Yammine from the Lebanese Army Engineering Corps for his invaluable insights. We are also thankful for the analyses, information and expert advices provided by:

- Walid Abou Zaki, Executive Director at Al-Iktissad wal-Aamal Group;
- Margunn Indreboe Alshaikh, Senior Inter-Agency Coordinator at United Nation Development Programme (UNDP);
- Pierre-Henri Aubry, Senior Officer at the French Ministry of Defense;
- Rola Azour, Senior Economist Advisor at United Nation Development Programme (UNDP);
- Gilbert Doumit, Managing Partner at Beyond Reform & Development;
- Youssef Fawaz, Executive Director at Al Majmoua;
- Leila Kayssi, Chief Relief and Social Service Programs at United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA);
- Youssef Khalil, Executive Director—Financial Operation Department at Banque du Liban (BDL);
- Zeina Khoury, Head of the enterprise team at UNDP/Lebanese ministry of Economy;
- Flavio Lovisolo, Senior Expert—Regional coordinator for the Syrian crisis at the Embassy of Italy—Lebanon;
- Bastien Revel, Peace and Development officer at United Nation Development Programme (UNDP);
- Anabella Skof, Socio-economic recovery expert—Chief technical advisor at International Labor Office (ILO);
- Finally, we are indebted to the participants who attended the ESA workshop held on September 29, 2016 for their constructive criticisms.


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LEBANON
WITH A VIEW

A 2030 VISION OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS

THE SCENARIO FACTORY

DIRECTORS

P.S. KARIM MEJDAJ
Dr. ABDELMAOULA CHAAR