



LEBANON
WITH A VIEW

A 2030 VISION OF THE
REFUGEE CRISIS

THE SCENARIO FACTORY

COORDINATORS
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The scenario factory?



- ✓ A team...
- ✓ Informal think-tank established by the ESA in 2015 to produces foresight studies on on the long-term implications of major societal or economic issues in Lebanon
- ✓ Target: Lebanese authorities and civil society
- ✓ This is our first study

About this research question

Most documented refugee crisis ever, so why this research ?

- An unusual point of view: the Lebanese one
- An unusual time horizon: 2030
 - ✓ On average, a refugee stays 17 years in his / her country of asylum
 - ✓ 30 to 35% of the refugees stay when the condition for a return are met
 - ✓ 417,000 refugees in Lebanon are 3-14 years old
 - ✓ 75,000 Syrian children are born yearly in Lebanon

A long-term vision of the refugee crisis is the only one that makes sense

Syrian Refugees

Facts and Figures



Refugees?

Lebanon recent history

- ✓ 1948: Asylum granted to Palestinian refugees
 - ✓ Lebanese civil war: 900,000 Lebanese citizens became refugees
 - ✓ Syrian civil war: Asylum granted to 1 to 2 Mn Syrian refugees
- ⇒ Largest population of refugees generated by a single conflict in one generation

But...

The Levant is the cradle of asylum (1500 BC) = one of the earliest hallmarks of civilization

The # controversy

Country	# of registered refugees (UNHCR)	Refugees per capita
Lebanon	1,048,275	23%
Jordan	651,114	7%
Turkey	2,748,367	4%
EU 28	1,004,345	0.2%

- Increasing? Decreasing?
 - ✓ Estimates are contradictory
 - ✓ Official number used by Lebanese officials is 1.5 million
- A tipping point?
 - ✓ Around 1.5 million for most experts (the famous 2015 peak)
 - ✓ For some, there is no clear tipping point
 - ✓ Both are probably right (more than one tipping point)

Funding requirements


- Very high pressure
 - ✓ on schools, services, housing, infrastructures...
 - ✓ Also, Syrians are “expensive” refugees
- Donors contribution (2016)
 - ✓ Funding needed: USD 2.48 Bn (UNHCR)
 - ✓ Another USD 5,879 Bn requested by Lebanon for longer term investment in infrastructure, education...
- Low figure, considering the actual cost for Lebanon, *i.e.* :
 - ✓ \$13.1 Bn between 2012 and 2015
 - ✓ \$5.6 Bn in 2015 alone (over 11% of GDP)

Our Scenarios


The making of



A simple methodological approach



Selecting and ranking uncertainties



Our 2 critical uncertainties:



Sustainable
($< 450,000$)

**Number
of refugees**

Non-sustainable
(> 1.5 millions)



Weak


**Governance
of the state**

Strong



The scenario matrix

> 1.5 million refugees
(more than 25% of the total population)



The Three Scenarios



SARAJEVO BEACH

In short...

- Under the weight of the refugees internal tensions eventually threatened Lebanon's existence
- The international community did not let this happen, given the additional flow of refugees this would entail
- Lebanon is now a confederation of cantons - in fact a Bosnia-like international protectorate - governed by ruthless foreign experts of all sorts.

BOOT CAMP

In short...

- The Syrian war ended in part, but reconstruction had a limited impact on Lebanon's economy
- Syrian refugees, increasingly unwelcomed in Lebanon, began organizing themselves, leading to more repression and to a widening inter-community gap
- A major social and economic crisis ensued
- Eventually, a coup called by business elites took place
- Now, the Army runs Lebanon

In short...

- A large portion of refugees is now fully integrated in Lebanon
- Lebanon did this in exchange for a comprehensive economic recovery plan financed by the international community
- This meant drastic, but fruitful political changes: Lebanon is now more secular... and flourishing.
- It has also learned Tipping point management (Turkish style): new refugees easily « find » routes to Europe

PHOENIXIA

Key findings 1: some surprises



1. The lack of resilience of the Lebanese institutions:

- ✓ In *Sarajevo Beach*, they collapse,
- ✓ in *Phoenixia*, they are deeply reformed
- ✓ in *Boot Camp*, they are suspended for an indefinite period of time

⇒ **Irrespective of the scenario, the current political system does not hold**

2. The end of the Syrian conflict resolves less problems than expected:

- ✓ Potentially partial end of the war
- ✓ Potentially limited economic impact of Syria's reconstruction

3. Decreasing the number of refugees:


- ✓ does not boil down to less war in Syria: there are other ways, and some of them are not out of reach
- ✓ Less refugees in Lebanon is not necessarily good news, because no incentive to act

4. Who's there, who's not ...

- ✓ The Gulf countries are remarkably present (in 2 scenarios out of 3)
- ✓ Israel is remarkably absent (from every scenario)


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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Key findings 3: A roadmap for decision makers



So?



Seeking *Phoenixia*?



- ✓ Best scenario for the international community, notably the EU:
 - ✓ introduces a dose of secularism in the political system
 - ✓ enables the Lebanese central authority to grant Syrian refugees a status consistent with their long term stay in Lebanon.
- ✓ Plausible scenario because it spares Lebanon a shock therapy: 2030 leave sufficient time to explain, implement, and digest these reforms
- ✓ Implies, on the part of foreign donors, a large-scale economic recovery plan on top of their yearly contribution

What « deal » with the international community?

Lebanon can offer:

- ✓ Up to 200,000 work permits to refugees, pegged to the number of jobs created;
- ✓ If the number of Syrian refugees stabilizes under 1 Mn, Lebanon can commit to grant its citizenship to the second generation born and residing in Lebanon that would apply for it when they reach their majority

What « deal » with the international community?

In exchange, Lebanon should seek:

- ✓ A financial contribution equivalent to what Turkey obtained from the EU, that is, € 6 Bn over a 2-year period to be invested in infrastructure, notably to set up Special Economic Zones for manufacturing industries
- ✓ A commitment that donors would increase their own refugees quotas to maintain the 1 Mn refugee ceiling in Lebanon. This means involving absentee States, e.g. the US and the Gulf countries
- ✓ A duty free regime on “made in Lebanon” products exported to the EU, the US and the Gulf States (similar to the regime granted by the US to Haiti)

But...



- ✓ From the perspective of the Lebanese central authority, Phoenixia is neither the most desirable – nor the least painful – scenario
- ✓ A number of experts also view Phoenixia as a risky bet and an undemocratic move altogether
- ✓ The two alternative scenarios – Sarajevo beach and Boot Camp – are not very appealing either, but:
 - they are more comfortable (no action required from the Lebanese central authority)
 - they preserve the current sectarian – based political system – albeit in different manners

In sum...



- ✓ Each of these scenario comes with an important – but different – price to pay for Lebanon, and this is why none can be consensual
- ✓ The choice is larger than it seems, because within each option, there is a shade to select.
- ✓ The task of the Scenario Factory was to describe where alternative routes would lead
- ✓ It is the task of the Lebanese central authority to choose one of them, whether through action or inaction

Thank You

